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I.  Expert Liability - an Implicit Dimension of Contracting? 
 
1.A Landmark Case in German Law 
  
A property owner intends to sell his house. He asks an architect who is the official 
and registered expert of the local bank (Sparkasse) to write an elaborate expertise 
about the value of the house and pays him the usual fees. Under the influence of the 
owner, the architect does not properly check the roof so that the factual statements in 
his expertise become flawed. On the basis of the expertise, the buyer pays a price 
which is unproportionally high. For factual reasons, the buyer cannot get relief from 
the seller and sues the architect. 
 
In a landmark decision of 1995, the German High Court (Bundesgerichtshof) 
construes –  generously disregarding the principle of contractual privity but in 
accordance with a long series of precedents - an analogy to a third party beneficiary 
contract.
1 The expertise contract between seller and architect is  supposed to contain 
an implied term, according to which the architect owes a contractual duty of correct 
performance – in technical terms: not only integrity interest but performance interest - 
to a third party, the buyer.
2 Moreover, disregarding its own precedents according to 
which a fiduciary relation between mandator and beneficiary would have to exist, the 
court boldly extends the construction which is already bold in itself, to competitive 
market situations, like the house market, where parties have antagonistic interests. 
Finally, disregarding the explicit wording of § 334  BGB, German civil code, which 
allows contractual defences against the third party, the court does not permit the 
architect to raise any defence stemming from his contract with the seller, who after all 
was responsible for the flawed expertise. The architect has to pay full damages to the 
buyer.  
 
This recent expansion of expert liability to third parties with antagonistic interests on 
the other side of the market – a judge-made law praeter legem if not contra legem
3 - 
                                            
* I would like to thank Gralf Calliess und Vaios Karavas for their comments. 
1 BGHZ 127, 378 – Dachstuhl. The first precedent was already decided in 1902, RGZ 52, 365. 
2 To be precise, according to the implied terms construed by the court, the architect is not under 
obligation of specific performance to the buyer, but once he performs, he owes a duty of care, 
including correct performance, not only to his contractual partner (the seller), but to a third person who 
is not a party to the contract (the buyer). 
3 Critics of the court use this strong language, e.g. Honsell (1999): 233. See also Medicus (1999): 
258f. entails high financial risks for a whole range of professionals, auditors, accountants, 
tax consultants, architects, accident insurance experts – and more recently analysts 
in the stock market. And there is a whole variety of concrete projects of considerable 
scale that their expertise is contracted for: complex acquisitions of property, large 
credit operations, construction projects, high risk financial transactions. Usually there 
is a triangular situation: the expert – in our example the architect - and two partners 
to a project, one of them the mandator – our seller - contracting with the expert who 
is supposed to give expert advice on the project, the other the beneficiary – our buyer 
- the third party who as a rule does not participate in the expertise contract. 
Frequently, the situation extends into a multilateral relation, including fourth, fifth, 
sixth ... umpteenth additional actors. They may directly cooperate in the project, they 
may be potential partners, they may finance the project via credit or support it with a 
guarantee, they may form part of a subsequent transaction chain, or they may be 
outsiders who suffer a damage from the project risks, and so on ad infinitum. The 
flood gates are open. 
 
The threat of open floodgates are the main reason why in most legal orders, expert 
liability to third parties is a highly contested subject.
4 Although there seems to be a 
broad consensus that expert liability should in principle go beyond the narrow 
boundaries of the bilateral expertise contract, the underlying principle is rather 
obscure, and the details of liability, particularly the scope of the protected persons, 
are hopelessly controversial. 
2.Open questions 
 
(1)  Underlying principle? Why should expert liability toward third parties be an 
implicit dimension of contract? It is only Germany, Austria and Switzerland that 
construe a third party beneficiary contract while many other legal orders in the 
civil and common law world treat it as a question of tort law. And there are voices 
that argue for quasi-contractual, quasi-tort constructions and, last not least, for 
“contort” solutions as a third way, independent from contract and tort. My point 
is: Whatever doctrinal construction is chosen, the substantive question remains 
the same: Is there in tort, contort or quasi-contract a “special relation” – in the 
words of a British judge “equivalent to contract”
5 (!) - that justifies the expert’s 
duty of care particularly toward the third person? Under what conditions does a 
relation between strangers qualify for such a “special relation” so that the expert 
becomes liable toward the third person, similar to the contractual liability 
between expert and mandator? In its substance this is the same question which 
from a different vantage point contract law is asking again and again: Is there an 
implied term, a hidden clause, a latent obligation, a deep structure, a dangerous 
supplement, in the contract which requires that third parties be internalised into 
the contractual liability regime? For the discussion of implicit contracting, expert 
liability has the attraction of the extreme and the paradigmatic. While in the 
normal situation, implied terms do nothing but change somewhat the standards 
of duties within an existing contract between two parties, in expert liability the 
implicity of contract asserts that “in reality” there exists a third party to the 
                                            
4 Comparative law analysis of expert liability in English and German law, Bar (1994). In general, Kötz 
(1990); (1996); Gottwald (1994); Müller (1995); Ebke (1996); Schönenberger (1999). For the floodgate 
problem in comparative perspective, Banakas (1996); Spier (1996). 
5 Hedley Burne & Co. Ltd. v. Heller & Partners Ltd (1964) A.C. 465 (H.L.), 529 and 539 (per Lord 
Devlin). contract. Im-plicity of third parties means here com-plicity of a hidden parasite 
who is not only profiting from the valuable expertise itself, but who is also insured 
against its risks, without paying for it. Expert liability transforms – whatever its 
doctrinal construction - a voluntarily agreed bilateral liability risk into an judicially 
imposed trilateral or even multilateral one. Is it not a blatant fiction to call this 
expansion an implicit dimension? 
 
(2)  Scope of protected persons? This is the crucial question for the law in action, 
whatever doctrine the law in the books is using. Tort law starts with a rather 
broad scope and is at pains to identify criteria that limit the infinite liability for 
purely economic loss. It looks for restrictions of an unlimited liability of the expert 
toward an infinite variety of persons that are causally influenced by the expert’s 
wrong information. Vice versa, contract law starts with the narrow scope of privity 
and has problems including additional beneficiaries. Both approaches aim at 
protecting persons which are affected by the expertise in a comparable way to 
the party to the contract. In practice, the courts differ dramatically. Using the 
criterion of foreseeability, some US-courts have drastically expanded the liability 
risk toward an almost indefinite range of third persons. French courts attempt to 
identify limits within the infinite chain of causation principle. German courts try to 
determine the “objective” purpose of the expertise contract in order to limit the 
beneficiaries. British courts try the same by applying the “particular transaction 
rule” within a case-by-case approach.
6 Is it realistic to say that there is 
something latent in the expertise contract that determines the number of 
protected persons? 
 
(3)  Conditions of liability? Equally controversial are the standards of duty of care that 
are owed to the third party. Are they determined in the contract between 
mandator and expert and then transferred to the beneficiary? Or do they result 
from standardization processes in the market? From decisions of professional 
organisations?  
 
(4)  Restrictions of expert liability? What about defences that the expert can raise 
against the mandator. Are they available to the expert against the beneficiary? 
What about exclusion of liability? Is there a third party effect? Can the expert 
exclude liability against the beneficiary? 
 
II.  The Origin of Implicit Dimensions: Institutional Embeddedness of 
Contract 
 
Does the concept of implicit dimensions of contract lead us here any further? Indeed, 
it does. However, one needs to abandon the narrow juridical concept of “implied 
terms in fact / in law” and related concepts of purely contractual interpretation. In 
order to make explicit the implicit dimension of contracting, law would have to look 
beyond the limits of the interpersonal relation and to inquire into those social 
institutions in which the contract participates, and into conflicts between them. Implicit 
aspects of contract have their origin in the “embeddedness” of contract in a variety of 
social institutions, outside the text and outside the interpersonal relation of the 
contracting parties. In identifying the institutions where the contract is embedded in 
                                            
6 Caparo Industries Plc v. Dickman (1990) 2 A.C. 605. there is  a certain but limited amount of assistance from external disciplines. 
Recourse to the economic concept of “complete contracting” is helpful as are 
sociological theories of economic transactions, but only to a limited degree.
7 The 
main work has to be done by legal theory and contractual doctrine, namely  to identify 
social institutions relevant for contract and to reconstruct them within the boundaries 
of the legal discourse.
8  
 
Indeed, institutional economics and empirical sociology suggest to interpret implicit 
dimensions of contract as a matter of the context of economic transactions. What is 
needed, they would propose, is a thorough empirical analysis of both the recursive 
patterns of interaction of the contracting parties, and the stable conventions of the 
market. The advantages of such a contextualist approach as compared to pure legal 
hermeneutics which unfolds the meaning of contractual texts are obvious
9. Relying 
on the richness of empirical details, judicial decisions will become more realistic. 
They will profit from the “tacit knowledge” of spontaneous orders, i.e. individual 
interaction patterns and collective customs of the trade.
10 Since legal decisions will 
be informed by social norms, their legitimacy will grow and the chances of 
compliance will increase. 
 
However, there are serious limitations to a spontaneous order approach if it is used 
to inform legal decision-makers. Interactional patterns and social customs inform 
legal arguments only about the results of underlying social conflicts, not about the 
conflicts themselves. They may be a wise or an unwise compromise, they may result 
from balanced negotiations or from a unilateral imposition of power, a sophisticated 
response to conflicting demands or thoughtless compliance with outmoded traditions,  
rational discourse or blind evolution, but in themselves they do not reveal the 
collisions between social systems to which the contract is exposed. Thus, patterns 
and customs do not provide for what legal argument would need urgently:  a critical 
reconstruction and reflection of the meaning of those social practices in which the 
contract is participating. Things get worse when in the concrete conflict  – as in our 
case of expert liability - there exists no reliable interactional pattern or enduring 
custom of the market that could be identified. What is left is nothing but conflict 
between different social practices which the law now is supposed to decide. 
 
My suggestion is, thus, not to abandon the contextual approach but to push it further. 
Do not just look for existing patterns and customs in the structural coupling of 
colliding social systems, but analyse the collision itself and do so from the standpoint 
of legal argumentation. Reconstruct the internal rationalities and the internal 
normativities of those social institutions that seek to impose their contradictory 
demands on the contract. This will produce the surplus value needed for legal 
argument. Once the collision is understood, a critical evaluation of the colliding 
normative principles, a careful re-assessment of the compromise found in actual 
patterns and customs, and a reasoned rule of preference between conflicting social 
practices will inform the legal decision.  
                                            
7 For complete contracting Cohen (2000); Craswell (2000); for social embeddedness Granovetter 
(1985). 
8 An exemplary analysis that pursues such a division of labour between socio-economic analyses of 
contract and legal theory and doctrine is  Collins (1999) passim. 
9 For a systematic overview in terms of different contractual techniques, see, Campbell and Collins, in 
this volume*.  
10 On tacit knowledge Polanyi (1958): 69 and passim; on spontaneous orders vs constructivism Hayek 
(1973): 17ff., 85ff., 118ff.; (1976): 11ff., 54ff.  
As I have argued at length elsewhere, for such an extended contextual approach, 
contract law needs to provide for an autonomous social reality construction which 
reformulates the contractual relation in terms of the polycontextural character of 
contemporary society.
11 To make a long story short: Social embeddedness of 
contract today does not mean its integration into a comprehensive social framework 
symbolised by coherent behavioural patterns and social customs, rather it means the 
conflict-ridden exposure of contract to a multitude of highly developed social 
rationalities that collide with each other.  This situation may be described as a 
difference of language games, but it entails more than to decide between two 
language games of contracting, the descriptive language of the historian and the 
normative language of the lawyer.
12 A concrete contract is written in terms of several 
language games which simultaneously impose their rules on the agreement.
13 In 
making explicit these implicit dimensions of contract, the law takes account of the 
conflicting requirements of three social practices in which the contract always already 
participates (1) the ongoing interactional relation of the parties, its history and its 
context, (2) the economic institutions of financing the transaction, (3) most 
importantly in our context, the social institutions within the productive process in 
which the contract is embedded.  
III.Three Implicit Dimensions of Transaction 
 
What is gained for the problem of expert liability if it is re-examined in the context of 
these three configurations and their conflicts? In the current debate on expert liability, 
it has become common practice to present exclusively one of them as the very basis 
for deciding on third party liability. Contextualist lawyers point to the contractual 
relation, legal economists point to markets and hierarchies, legal sociologists point to 
relations of trust. In our perspective all three appear as narrow and one-sided 
approaches. Instead, we shall identify as basis of expert liability fundamental conflicts 
between these contracting worlds. In particular, the conflicts concern the boundaries 
of the obligation. An expertise transaction participates in different language games – 
in the contractual interaction of mandator and expert, in the economic context of 
monetary operations, in the social context of producing the expertise. Each of these 
contracting worlds imposes on the transaction a different “privity”, i.e different 
boundaries, different rules of membership, different principles of exclusion and 
inclusion. The language games involved display variations of bilateral, trilateral and 
multilateral obligations. While in many types of contract, the implied configurations 
have more or less identical boundaries, it is the peculiarity of the expertise 
transaction that is exposed to a collision of different privities which contract law is 
asked to decide.  
1. Interaction of the Parties to the Contract 
 
Over and over again, attempts have been made to identify the foundations for expert 
liability toward third parties in the contractual relation itself. In Germany, courts 
started with constructions of a silent agreement between mandator and expert 
                                            
11 See Teubner (2000) and critical comments by Macneil, Gerstenberg, Campbell. 
12 Campbell and Collins, in this volume*. 
13 See the concept of „internormativity“ developed by Belley (1998): 203ff.; (2002): 142ff.; from a 
systemic point of view Crone (1993): 162ff.; Müller (1997): 146ff.  according to which the expert will be liable toward outsiders.
14 Since third party 
beneficiary contracts were solidly established and the general erosion of the privity 
principle had already begun this seemed an elegant solution. But again and again 
this had been rejected as a blatant fiction. Thus the courts moved from fiction toward 
contextual interpretation, to terms implicit in the contract.
15 But the criteria they were 
using had their origin clearly outside of the contractual interaction. Basically, they 
inquired whether the transaction is creating considerable risks for third persons 
(Leistungsnähe), a question which obviously cannot be answered by either silent 
agreement between the parties or by norms and practices that emerge in the history 
of their interaction.  
 
Actually, all the dimensions of the bilateral interaction –  whether explicit or implicit, 
whether classical, neo-classical or relational  – militate against the inclusion of third 
parties into the liabilities of the expertise contract.
16 What is worse, the contract is not 
the solution; it is part of the problem. Contract itself is at the very root of the collision 
of privities. The contract between mandator and expert is actually building up a 
relation of co-operation, of trust and of mutual interest responsiveness between them. 
And it is this mutual dependency relation between the mandator and the expert that 
creates or at least strengthens the interest conflict involved. Thus, recourse to the 
actual negotiation of the parties, their agreement in its details, the history of their 
interaction, the co-operative relation between them, the norms that emerge over time 
-  all this has never uncovered and will never uncover traces that  would serve as 
foundation for liability toward third parties. It is recourse to other social practices 
outside of the parties’ interaction that may justify this liability which is only poorly 
covered by contractual rhetoric. 
2. Economic Institutions 
 
What about the embeddedness of the expert contract in economic processes? Does 
the recourse to the context of monetary operations provide criteria for third party 
liability? Contracts are not simply interpersonal relations of negotiation, consensus 
and performance; they participate in wider economic institutions, in markets, 
economic organisations, financial arrangements, transaction chains, co-operative 
networks. And indeed, economic concepts related to these institutions - avoidance of 
opportunistic behaviour and the idea of complete contracting - have been presented 
to justify expert liability toward third parties. 
 
One economic argument for expert liability is to reduce the risks of opportunistic 
behaviour.
17 Monetary sanctions of liability will serve as a deterrence against 
deceptive expertise. Of course, this is a valid argument and economic calculation 
may indeed determine the optimal sanction which steers a middle course between 
deterrence of the expert’s opportunism and the beneficiary’s opportunism to use 
expert liability as a cheap insurance against speculative risks.
18 However, economic 
analysis in itself does not and cannot provide the standards defining what counts as 
the expert’s opportunistic behaviour, and what not. What is the economic mechanism 
that could possibly determine the expert’s behaviour as opportunistic? Rational 
                                            
14 Starting 1902, RGZ 52, 365. 
15 For a recent case analysis, Zugehör (2000). 
16 Gernhuber (1989): 518ff; Picker (1999): 400ff.; Esser and Schmidt (2000): § 34 IV 2c. 
17 For implied terms in general Cohen (2000). 
18 Ewert (1999): 200.  action? No, rational choice may determine under what cost/benefit relations rational 
actors will respect social norms of professional expertise. However, these norms do 
not result from the action of self-interested actors, rather “the rational pursuit of self-
interest is constrained by social norms”.
19  Mandator and expert delineate their 
respective interests but they will never agree on liability for third parties. This is the 
reason why the concept of complete contracting does not help in this context.
20 
Judges who mimic the behaviour of rational actors in contracting would never come 
up with the expert’s liability toward third persons. Transaction costs minimisation? 
No, this is an approach that reckons openly with opportunism defined as seeking for 
self-interest with guile.
21 Transaction cost considerations come into play when parties 
choose institutional arrangements to protect themselves against opportunism from 
the other side. Cost-benefit calculations? No, these are made once the social norm 
exists, the intensity of the sanction and the probability of sanctioning is known. To be 
sure, there are social norms that are emerging within economic institutions (e.g. rules 
of cooperation, competition, hierarchy etc.). But expertise responsibility are social 
norms that are defined in the context of science, morality or politics, in any case in 
non-economic contexts. 
3. Social Relations 
 
Thus, the implicit dimensions of contracting, where principles of expert responsibility 
toward third parties are established, seem to refer to non-economic social relations. 
In the current debate, four related social configurations are offered as the implicit 
source of expert liability: trust, profession, institution. 
 
Trust is at present re-discovered by economists and sociologists
22. It refers to a 
social situation in which risky actions are undertaken without sufficient security about 
future developments.
23 Lawyers as well are using the category of trust in our context 
and propose reliance liability as a complement to contractual liability.
24 No doubt that 
trust is the right category to describe the social relation between the expert and the 
beneficiary who due to his reliance on the expertise takes a risky decision. Under 
certain circumstances this trust deserves to be legally protected. But trust is a 
ubiquitous social phenomenon and its juridification has produced very specific legal 
constructs against which it makes no sense to re-interpret them as an expression of 
trust. The crucial question, whether a social trust relation should be supported by 
legal sanctions or not, cannot be answered by the inner structure or by the intensity 
of the trust relation itself.
25 Unlike contract which contains in itself the conditions 
under which a legal obligation is created, trust is in itself legally empty. For its 
promotion to legal status it needs external criteria. It is the object of trust, the social 
                                            
19 This is of course hotly debated. For a reference in the rational choice camp that makes this point 
Elster (1988); (1991); (1994). Elster gives a classification of those social norms that cannot be derived 
from rational choice principles (consumption norms, norms against behaviour contrary to nature, 
norms regulating the use of money, work norms etc.) 
20 Convincing  arguments by Picker (1999): 402ff. It is indicative that Köndgen (1999) attempts to 
utilize the economic concept of complete contracting for third party effects in general, but when it 
comes to expert liability (44ff.), feels compelled to resort to sociological concepts (expectation, trust, 
role conflicts, profession). 
21 Williamson (1985).  
22 For a detailed economic analysis of trust Ripperger (1998); for its organisational analysis Kramer 
(1999); for socio-legal studies on trust in contract Lane and Bachmann (1996); Deakin et al. (1997) 
23 For a sociological theory of trust Luhmann (1979): Ch. 4. 
24 The protagonist of a legal concept of trust in German law is Canaris (1971); (1995); (1999). 
25 Luhmann (1979): Ch. 4. institution toward which trust is oriented, that decides about the legal relevance of 
trust.
26 
 
Profession is another social configuration which lawyers use as a basis for expert 
liability.
27 Referring back to mediaeval concepts of “public calling” and “common 
carrier” it revitalises old status obligations that are supposed to complement modern 
contractual obligations. Even in the absence of a binding contract, members of a 
profession carry specific obligations to other people as a consequence of their 
position in society. But there is a strange asymmetry in the concept of professional 
obligation. It is as asymmetric as the complementary concept of consumer protection 
would be. It derives rights and duties from the social status of only one person within 
a complex social relation, instead of taking all the different positions in a multilateral 
relation and their interdependence into account. Furthermore, it relies too much on 
self-regulation in professional associations, instead of looking to the requirements of 
the whole social relation in which the association is just one part. And it is much too 
static stressing the established norms of a status role, instead of looking to the 
dynamic process of norm production in a social configuration that from the beginning 
involves other autonomous actors than just the professional.   
 
If our goal is to make visible the social configuration as a whole in which the 
transaction participates, one would have to leave aside asymmetric status concepts 
like professional responsibility (or consumer protection). One would have to identify 
the entire multilateral social context in which the productive aspects of the transaction 
takes place. One would need to look at the social dynamics and not only to a set of 
rules around the role of a professional. Mere roles are not sufficient, instead the 
dynamic interplay of operations, structures, boundaries and systems need to come 
into play. For this purpose, the concept of institution seems to be most adequate.
28 
Against the concept of profession it has three advantages. Institutions reflect the 
whole social system involved and not only partial aspects. At the same time, as 
complexes of social norms, institutions bridge the focal social system to the legal 
system, in our case to the concrete contract, by their very normativity.  Finally, 
institutions are more than just sets of norms or existing customs. They are coherent 
complexes of normative structures within full-fledged social systems, and are the 
result of more or less explicit reflection of their social function and their contribution to 
other systems. Seen from the side of law, institutions and not social systems as such 
are the object of legal decisions to accept the social norm in question as legal or 
not.
29 Contract law decides on the legal positivisation of social institutions when it 
refers to the implicit dimensions of contract.
30 These may be economic institutions, as 
mentioned above, or wider social institutions.  
 
IV.  Expertise as a Social Institution 
 
                                            
26 Leenen (1990):119ff., comes very close to this position 
27 Lammel (1979): 345ff; Hopt (1983); (1986); (1987); (1996). 
28 The concept of institution which has been rather neglected after a promising start, Romano (1918); 
Hauriou (1965), has experienced a remarkable revival. For sociology, Friedland and Alford (1992) 
Selznick (1992); for organizational analysis, Powell and Di Maggio (1991); Scott (1995); for economics 
Williamson (1985); Furubutn and Richter (1997); Klein (2000); for socio-legal analysis, MacCormick 
and Weinberger (1986); Black (1997). 
29 Luhmann (1965): 12f.; (1985): Ch, II.4 and 6. 
30 Teubner (1992): 1446ff. The foundations of expert liability, as we said above, cannot be found if one looks to 
economic institutions (market, economic organisation, financing practices, networks). 
But what about “expertise” as an autonomous social institution? Indeed, expertise 
bridges scholarship (natural sciences, social sciences, humanities) with other social 
practices. Of course, expertise is not to be identified with science as a social system 
in its own right. Professional expertise serves other social ends than the 
advancement of knowledge as such. But it brings necessarily the institutional logic of 
scientific inquiry into social fields that are governed by a different rationality.
31 
Expertise cannot simply be equated with any production of information by 
professionals. Rather, people turn to independent expertise as a special institution, 
once they experience the limits of negotiation, of economic exchange, of political 
power processes, of legal conflict resolution, of family relations or friendship for 
resolving their problems. They separate the issue involved from its familiar context 
and subsume it under the rationality of expertise which differs sharply from their day-
to-day practices. 
 
As a consequence, scientific expertise in mundane projects suffers from orientation 
conflicts. It is a highly fragile social institution which is exposed to a paradoxical 
situation. Although it is introduced into other social fields in order to help to resolve 
some of their pressing problems, it depends at the same time on strict insulation 
against the interference of their competing rationalities.
32 While science itself as a 
social institution enjoys at least the protection of the ivory tower, an institutional 
separation from the exigencies of social life in universities and scholarly publications, 
expertise is systematically exposed to the temptations of influence, persuasion, 
power relation, family ties, and profit. This inherent risk of expertise is the very reason 
why the above mentioned social mechanism of trust in expertise cannot not give 
sufficient protection, but needs to be supported by law. 
 
There are many rules of public law that aim to protect the integrity of expertise. Public 
law regulation on education, on professionalisation, on academic degrees, on 
licensing, and on monitoring and supervision of experts have played an important 
role forming expertise as a “public service”.
33 The important point here is that 
expertise as a rule is not – cannot be and should not be -  integrated into public 
administration.
34 Instead, public law utilises a type of regulation that is supposed to 
respect the autonomy of independent expertise also within the public sector and to 
shape its rules as to insulate it against the pressing demands of power politics and 
bureaucratic administration. Thus, law seeks to guarantee the interplay of three 
crucial orientations  - function, contribution and reflexion
35  - within the institution of 
expertise itself. The question of function is: What is the role of expertise in the social 
context involved? How can expertise combine its potential with ongoing social 
processes? The question of contribution is: What are the advantages that different 
actors gain from the knowledge production of expertise? The question of reflexion is: 
How can these two divergent perspectives be reconciled? Public law regulation does 
not answer one of these questions directly. Rather, it creates procedures and 
obligations that allow for an internal balancing of  function, contribution and reflexion 
within the dynamics of expertise itself. But it interferes directly in cases of blatant 
                                            
31 For this problematic relation Luhmann (1990): 616ff. 
32 Sciulli (1992): 205ff. 
33 Lammel (1979): 362ff. 
34 For all kind of „public services“ that do not fall into public administration, Teubner (1998): 402ff. 
35 Luhmann (1984): Ch. 2; (1997): 757ff. “misuse” when the subtle mechanisms of self-regulation are perceived as not to work 
properly. 
 
Once expertise is utilised in the private sector, the same problem comes up but now 
in a different institutional context. Of course, buying and selling expertise is nothing 
new in the private sector, but under the auspices of ongoing privatisation processes, 
the production of knowledge for projects in the private sector is increasingly taking 
place as an economic transaction. If the institution of expertise is no longer under a 
public law regime but under a regime of private contracts, how will its institutional 
integrity survive?
36 Do the rules of private law have the capacity to guarantee – or at 
least to facilitate - an autonomous balancing of function, contribution and reflexion? 
 
One solution in the private sector is collective action in the private sector. Private 
standardisation associations are a case in point.
37 Private actors create non-profit 
associations that become independent of the short-term interests of their founders. 
Although these associations act in commercial contexts, their institutional design 
increases their chances to display of sufficient autonomy to develop a firm normative 
orientation toward principles of independent inquiry. Their character as an 
autonomous formal organisation facilitates reflection processes – within the 
organisation and/or in the context of a larger public – that strike a precarious balance 
between their social function and their contribution to private projects. The sensitivity 
of public opinion against a “politicisation” of these associations and against other 
forms of structural corruption testifies to a successful institutionalisation of expertise 
in the private sector. 
 
But what about buying and selling expertise via a bilateral contract? If the provision of 
expertise – and here comes the crucial question - “is to be delivered by contractual 
mechanisms, what conditions of implicit dimensions need to be established for this 
mechanism for delivery to operate as intended?”
38 Here, a fundamental conflict, the 
direct collision between the principles of contractual loyalty and expertise impartiality, 
comes to the fore.
39  
 
Expertise, if it is supposed to work properly, needs to be supported by (in)visible 
hand mechanisms which guide its orientation firmly toward principles of scientific 
inquiry. Application of rigorous methodical standards, orientation toward a 
comprehensive body of concepts and theories, reliance on inter-subjective 
consensus in the community of experts, strict insulation against interference of 
outside political or economic interests, neutrality and impartiality in relation to the 
interests of the clients involved, are primary among them.
40   
 
Bilateral contracting on the other side creates for the expert the legitimate obligation 
of co-operation, trust, interdependence and loyalty toward the economic interests of 
the mandator. The expert is under the contractual obligation to further the interests of 
his client, to use his scientific-methodical instruments to advance the position of his 
                                            
36 This is the general theme in Teubner (1998). 
37 Joerges, Ladeur and Vos (1997). 
38 Campbell and Collins in this volume MS 3.* 
39 For theorising the larger historical and social background of these conflicts, see Sciulli (1992): 40ff.  
40 For a recent comprehensive reformulation of the fundamental social norms in the scientific 
community, Ziman (2000): 28ff. partner to the contract, who after all finances the expertise.
41 In the contractual 
perspective it would appear even as illoyal if the experts took into account other 
interests than those of his partner, worse, if he took into account antagonistic 
interests on the other side of the market, worse even, if he balanced these interests 
against each other independently.
42 The contract favours legitimately the expertise’s 
orientation toward its contribution to the mandator at the expense of its contribution to 
other social actors and at the expense of its social function. 
 
Thus, private law faces a sharp collision between two legitimate self-regulatory 
institutions – contract and expertise. The situation can be compared with private 
arbitration where the ethos of dispute resolution by third parties clashes with the 
ethos of self-interest in contracting. In the case of the private expertise, the ethos of 
contract - privity, particularism, interest orientation, utility, and loyalty - clash directly 
with the ethos of scientific inquiry - public knowledge, universalism, 
disinterestedness, originality and scepticism. 
 
Judicial intervention or non-intervention – that is the question. It is frequently 
suggested that private law leave this collision of self-regulating institutions to meta-
self-regulation.
43 Especially economists tend to recommend this strategy as “penalty 
default”.
44 If parties fail to write a contract which would include the third person, the 
incompleteness is presumed to be inefficient, whether unintended or strategic, and 
the court’s approach should be to deter this behavior and encourage complete 
contracting. The foreseeable result would be an evolutionary process, a “drift” toward 
unmediated interest competition, in which over time private independent expertise will 
transform itself into partisan expertise.
45 The constant pressures of the institution of 
contract will gradually change the institution of expertise into a procedure which will 
become known (not necessarily as “junk science” but) as partisan expertise. In the 
long run, people will get used to second-order observation: Who paid for the 
expertise? And they will act accordingly. As a consequence, independent private 
expertise via bilateral contracting will vanish from the market. In commercial 
situations where expert information becomes necessary, the other side of the market 
will be compelled to provide for its own partisan expertise. Then law’s job will be 
more limited, to make sure that deceit and fraud are somewhat reduced in those 
frequent situations when partisan advice is sold on the market as “independent” 
expertise. At this point it becomes clear why a mere orientation of law toward 
contractual patterns and conventions of the market which had been discussed above 
is problematic. They do not but record the result of blind evolutionary processes – in 
our case the “drift” of independent expertise to partisan expertise - without making 
visible that two legitimate self-regulatory regimes are conflicting.  
 
Judicial intervention is needed, however, if the integrity of independent expertise is to 
be maintained within the private sector. More abstractly, it is needed to facilitate an 
internal reflective balancing of institutional contributions to social actors (the 
mandator, beneficiary, others) against its social function (advancement of knowledge 
in non-scientific sectors of society). This is the reason why it is an important matter of 
                                            
41 Philippsen (1999): 9. 
42 Philippsen (1999): 23. 
43 Honsell (1999): 233. 
44 Cohen (2000): 83. 
45 This is the central tenet of the theory of societal constitutionalism, Sciulli (1992): 40 ff. public policy to declare that expertise comprise a legally “protected sphere” within 
civil society. Thus,  
 
“the state in essence buffers these enterprises ‘artificially’ from 
all  other  spheres‘  more  ‘natural’  condition,  that  of  immediate 
competition within economic and political market places”
46 
 
Once this is accepted, the option is either to exclude bilateral contracts generally 
from expertise matters, or to search for spaces of compatibility. Now, it is obvious 
that an outright prohibition of bilateral contracting is counter-productive. Contracting 
expertise serves here as a flexible and productive social mechanism that makes 
expertise responsive to projects in different areas of social life.
47  It is a healthy 
antidote to the old disease that expertise as an independent social institution has in 
itself a tendency of following its self-interested path of inquiry and loses contact with 
the social project that are at its roots. In many situations there are good reasons for a 
tightly written contract to discipline the internal dynamics of expertise and to oblige 
the process of inquiry to its contribution to a concrete project, if only it can be avoided 
that the contract undercuts the principles of independent inquiry.  
 
Thus, the task at hand is to search for spaces of compatibility between contract and 
expertise, to search for a legal regime that furthers an internal reflection on the 
balance of function and contributions. Here, third party liability comes in. It appears 
as an adequate means to create a space of compatibility. It provides a solution for a 
typical collision of contracting worlds. It does so by redefining “privities”, i.e. the 
external boundaries of the interpersonal relations. While the concrete project, 
whether in the technological, social, scientific or medical sector, requires one 
comprehensive multilateral relation, which formalises the agreed upon co-operation 
of several actors, the concrete contract and the economic market relation is 
fragmenting the multilateral complex into various strictly bilateral relations. The 
“privity” of the relation is defined differently by the contract and by the project. Third 
party liability dissolves this conflict of different privities in favour of the multilateralism 
inherent in the expertise. Via liability law, the social institution of expertise forces the 
bilateral contract to transform itself into a multilateral obligation. The conflict between 
multilateral social networks and the bilateral economic transactions forces the law to 
account for third party effects of contracting, even if this contradicts the sacred privity 
of contract, reduces allocative efficiency and increases transaction costs. 
 
If then as a matter of law, responsibility for third parties is included into the contract, 
the one-sided contractual duty of loyalty is counter-balanced by a liability supplement 
toward the other participant in the project. Thus, despite its contractual loyalty, private 
expertise  can  regain  its  requisite  neutral  and  impartial  orientation.  Independent 
expertise as an institution, as a complex of social expectations, thus represents one 
of the non-contractual elements of contract which – as a matter of law - the private 
autonomy of the parties has to respect.
48 Whenever expertise is organised under a 
                                            
46 Sciulli (1992): 207. 
47 For a general account, Luhmann (1990): 616ff. 
48 This refers of course to Durkheim’s famous formulation of „non contractual elements of contract“ 
which in our words represent the embeddedness of contract in various social institutions, Durkheim 
(1933): 206. It is indicative that the German courts use the concept of „purpose“ to internalise the non-
contractual elements into the contract. The courts define the „purpose“ of an expertise contract „to 
create trust and to serve as an instrument of proof“, BGHZ 127, 257, 261. private law regime, the requirement that it is complemented by third party liability is a 
necessary implicit dimension of this regime. 
 
What happens here to the collision of language games? Once third party liability is 
introduced, the fundamental conflict between contractual loyalty and 
disinterestedness of expertise which seemed to be irreconcilable is not resolved by 
law in favour of the one or the other. Rather, it is transformed into something else. 
There are two major moves involved. (1) Seen from the perspective of social 
contribution, the third party liability rule changes the asymmetric contractual 
obligation to the interests of the mandator into a symmetric obligation to the interests 
of both parties to the project. This is important enough since it creates equidistance 
to the commercial interests involved and allows the expert to balance their interests 
against each other. But this is a limited perspective, since it takes only individual 
interests into account. (2) Seen from the perspective of expertise’s social function: 
the second move transforms the expert’s obligation to personal interests into his 
obligation to the project.
49 With this new project-orientation, liability achieves to 
institutionalise what we were looking for. Expectations of contractual loyalty with its 
potential of corrupting independent expertise will be “translated” into the impersonal, 
disinterested, and objective orientation of expertise. At the same time, expertise is no 
longer free to escape into the lofty space of self-sufficient logic of discovery, but the 
legal bonds of contractual loyalty and the bonds of third party liability tie it firmly down 
and “translate” abstract knowledge into the concrete expertise which is needed for 
the real world project. 
 
To express our result in one quasi-magic formula:  third party liability symbolises the 
transformation of interest-bound expertise into project-bound expertise. The 
existence of this liability is a highly visible threshold that separates two institutions. It 
draws a limit between partisan expertise where knowledge its (legitimately) used for 
the pursuit of private interests and independent expertise where knowledge is applied 
in an disinterested way with in-built controls of reliability and where it is independent 
from personal loyalty and reciprocity considerations. Expert liability to third party 
marks the boundary between the fields of economic and scientific rationality. 
 
It should be stressed again that it is not the abstract ideal of scientific inquiry as such, 
but the close intertwinement of both, independent expertise and the concrete project, 
that lies at the roots of third party liability. “Project-bound expertise” – this is the 
institutional idée directrice. This idea unfolds along two implicit dimensions of 
contracting. As such, expertise imports principles of the scientific community that 
need now to be respected in the contract: disinterestedness, impartiality, 
independence, orientation on methodical standards, and responsibility toward each 
participant in the realisation of the project. The details of third party liability – doctrinal 
construction, scope of beneficiaries, standards, defences and exclusion of liability – 
however, are to be determined in an institutional perspective which is informed by the 
concrete project to which the expertise is under obligation.  
 
                                            
49 From a different theoretical perspective, the trust relation, Canaris (1999): 234ff. stresses the 
project-orientation of expertise as the relevant legal criterion. Again from a different perspective, the 
special factual relation which shuts the floodgates of infinite expert liability, Picker (1999): 440ff., 
focuses on the project which binds expertise even without a contract. V.  Project-oriented Expertise: Selected Legal Issues 
1. Adequate Doctrinal Construction 
 
To find the adequate doctrinal construction for an institutional liability toward third 
parties is not an abstract exercise on the tabula rasa of sociological jurisprudence, 
rather it depends on historical contingencies of how different national legal systems 
have drawn the fine line between contract and tort in general which in its turn 
depends on how they developed the conceptual potential (and/or deficiencies) of 
several specific doctrines, like implied terms, consideration, contractual privity, culpa 
in contrahendo, third party beneficiary contracts, on the one hand and special tort 
relations, duty of care, respondeat superior, compensation for pure economic loss, 
limits of causation on the other hand.
50 In this context it has often been mentioned 
that there is a striking identity of the criteria for third party liability, whatever the 
doctrinal construction. These criteria are: the professional position of the expert; the 
relevance of the information for the third party; the concrete circumstances of the 
production and transportation of the information; foreseeability of the usage of the 
information by third parties; the amount of reliance on the information.
51 This is also 
true for the implicit dimension of “project-bound expertise”. In the inner structures of 
this private institution we find the conditions of the special relation “akin to contract” 
that tort and quasi-tort law is looking for, as well as the famous non-contractual 
element of contract law.
52 
 
In legal orders that have opted for a contractual solution, a fierce battle is raging 
between two camps of legal doctrine. One camp – among them the courts - favour 
third party beneficiary contract and its doctrinal derivatives. They start with the 
contract between mandator and expert and extract from its implicit dimensions the 
liability of the expert toward the non-contracting beneficiary.
53 The other camp – 
among them eminent scholars - fight for culpa in contrahendo liability of non-
contracting partners. They start with the second contract involved, the project 
contract between the mandator and the beneficiary, and extract from its implicit 
dimensions a quasi-contractual liability of the expert who is not participating in the 
contract but as close to it “as if” he were a partner.
54 
 
From our institutional perspective, both are right and both are wrong at the same 
time. It is right to find the origin of the liability in the “implicit” dimensions of the 
expertise contract, although they are non-contractual. And it is equally right to see it 
an “implicit” dimension of  the project contract, although they are non-contractual. But 
they are both wrong since they miss the crucial element of “binding” the expertise 
tightly to the project. The key-concept to third party liability is interdependence of the 
two contracts, in our terms, the legal obligation of expertise to project and vice 
                                            
50 See Bar (1999).  
51 Schneider (1999): 252. 
52 I have a certain preference for a contractual solution of expert liability which, I hope, is not 
exclusively determined by national bias. The main reason is that expert liablitiy is oriented to 
performance interest and not to integrity interest. The beneficiary does not suffer from the realisation 
of a risk that the expertise entailed for his belongings, rather he suffers from performance risks of a 
transaction of a valuable good, the information. 
53 Main protagonist BGH 127, 378 – Dachstuhl. 
54 Main protagonist Canaris (1999): 222ff. Cf. also Adolff (1997): 118ff.; Neuner (1999): 135. versa.
55 Thus, for legal orders that are gradually developing a doctrine of “connected 
contracts”, like groupe de contrats in the francophone world, network contract and 
connected contract in the Anglo-Saxon world, Vertragsverbund in the German 
speaking countries, the doctrinal foundation most adequate to the institution of 
project-bound expertise should indeed lie here.
56 Project-oriented expertise relations 
would be just another case of a whole variety of contract networks with more than 
two actors involved.
57 In these relations, the law regularly discovers implicit 
dimensions beyond the mere party consensus in bilateral contracts.
58 As a matter of 
course, in contract networks quasi-contractual liabilities emerge between parties that 
have no explicit contractual ties.
59 Obviously, this is a promising perspective for the 
future. However, at present, only second-best solutions are available in legal 
doctrine, i.e. contractual or quasi-contractual constructs, each with their well-known 
deficiencies. 
 
In my view, third party beneficiary contract is at the end more adequate to the 
institutional dimension of project-expertise than is culpa in contrahendo of third 
parties. The latter has been originally created as a liability of third parties 
(Sachwalter) who are not formally participating in the contract but who fulfil three 
conditions: (1) they act within in the “camp” of one of the contracting parties, (2) they 
themselves have a substantial economic interest in the transaction which makes 
them to “quasi-parties” to the contract, (3) however, they act in such a way that the 
other party to the contract has reasons to trust them.
60 Independent experts clearly 
fulfil the third condition, but they stand in diametrical contrast to the first and second 
one.
61 Disinterestedness in the economic stakes of either party to the project contract 
is a necessary precondition of project-bound expertise. Thus, independent experts 
should not be treated within the same legal category as are partisan experts, who are 
acting in the same camp as the one party who furnish information to the other party. 
To put both into the same category as culpa in contrahendo suggests, would blur the 
fundamental legal distinction between advocacy expertise and independent 
expertise. The liability standards of independent experts should not be downgraded 
to the standards of partisan advice. 
  
There is another reason to prefer third party beneficiary contract. If the problem at 
hand is to reconstruct in law a comprehensive multilateral institution like project-
bound expertise, culpa in contrahendo would only arrive at three (or more) bilateral 
relations that are isolated against each other. Conversely, third party beneficiary 
contract explicitly opens the conceptual space for one overarching legal relation, in 
which the interdependencies between the project, the expertise and the interests of 
                                            
55 This is where Picker (1999): 432ff. identifies the „special relation“ needed for liability for purely 
economic loss. 
56 For network contracts, Adams and Brownsword (1990); Rohe (1998). For a general concept of 
“connected contracts” which would cut through contract law and company law Gulati, Klein and Zolt 
(2000). 
57 Picker (1999): 440ff., argues to qualify expertise relations  as „connected contracts“ which would be 
the „special relation“ as basis of liability  
58 For “connected contracts” in general Gulati, Klein and Zolt (2000) 929f.; for Vertragsverbund in 
German law Gernhuber (1989): 711; Heermann (1998):  93;  96ff.; 106. 
59 For networks in general, Teubner (2002): 325ff. For heterarchical networks Rohe (1998): 195ff.; for 
just in time networks  Lange (1998): 195ff.; for virtual enterprises Lange (2001): 188ff., 192; for 
franchising networks Teubner (1991): 129ff.; Baumgarten (1993): 169ff. 
60 Emmerich in: Rebmann, Säcker and Rixecker (2001): vor § 275, 172ff. The leading monographs on 
Sachwalterhaftung are Wiegand (1991): 30ff.; Henke (1997): 16ff., 53, 132f. 
61 Canaris (1999): 226 downplays the importance of this difference. several actors can be reconstructed, and rights and duties of all the parties involved 
can be fine-tuned in relation to each other.
62 Still a second-best solution, third party 
beneficiary contract comes closest to the institutional core, the unitary network of 
three closely interconnected transactions. 
2. Scope of Protected Persons 
 
The most difficult concrete problem is to determine which among the persons, that 
are exposed to the risk of the expertise and rely on it for relevant decisions, will be 
entitled to claim third party liability. What are legitimate criteria to determine the 
scope of protected persons? Several court decisions have applied the criterion of 
foreseeability of the informational contact between expert and beneficiary-victim.
63 As 
a consequence, financial liability of auditors and accountants has expanded to an 
almost infinite number of investors. Other courts have looked to the degree of 
exposure to risk, some have manipulated the doctrine of causation in order to limit 
the number of protected persons. From our institutional perspective, all three criteria 
are misplaced. The relevant legal question is not to identify the integrity interest of all 
those persons who while relying on certain information take risks and suffer 
damages. Rather, the task is to take account of the specific institutional integrity of 
expertise. If project-bound expertise is the social institution in which the contract 
participates, then it is the obligation to the project that defines the limits to its 
responsibility to third persons.
64 Here again, the intertwinement of expertise and 
project decides who is entitled to liability and who not. The limits of the project 
determine the limits of special responsibility for others persons, and not foreseeability 
of damage, exposure to risk or principles of causation. Accordingly, the expert is 
responsible for the performance of his information transaction exclusively to the 
participants to the concrete project. Third party liability - an implicit dimension of 
project-bound expertise  - is not a general responsibility for the integrity interest of 
outsiders. As we said above, it is a countervailing device to the asymmetry of 
contracting. It serves to protect the complex expertise relation against its 
bilateralisation through contract, but it does not serve as a general insurance against 
risky transactions that rely on expert information. 
 
Equally misplaced are typical contractual criteria. In order to determine the scope of 
protected persons, courts again and again search for indicators that refer to 
intentions of the parties, subjective knowledge of the destination of the expertise, 
concrete contacts between expert and beneficiary. These are misleading criteria, 
insofar as they are supposed to identify the will of the parties to create an obligation 
to the third party. In our institutional perspective, third party liability comes in 
independently of such an explicit or implicit agreement. It emerges even against the 
will of the parties. The central criterion is: Who participates in the project? One should 
hasten to add that the concrete circumstances of the three transactions involved do 
play a role in the determination, who is protected and who not. But there is a fine line 
                                            
62 Of course, it needs to be stressed that the reduction to consensus of two parties which the term 
“third party beneficiary contract” suggests is misleading. It should be replaced by “third party 
beneficiary obligation” in order to stress the non-contractual institutional character of the underlying 
expertise relation which is internalised into the contract via judge-made law. 
63 For a careful comparative analysis, Ebke (1995): 498ff. 
64 Picker (1999): 440ff. arrives at the same result from a different starting point. Canaris (1999): 234ff. 
who favours a liability based on trust, stresses this point, but admits at the same time that trust as 
such provides for no criteria and needs to be supplemented by additional criteria. Here is exactly the 
point where the institution of „project-bound expertise“ comes into play and provides for criteria. to be drawn: These circumstances serve as indicators for the delimitation of the 
concrete project, but not as indicators for a bilateral agreement on the expert’s 
liability. It is in the hands of the contracting parties to define the scope of information 
needed in the project-bound expertise, but it is no longer in their hands to determine 
the subsequent third party liability. 
 
Participation in the project as criterion is easy to apply in the core area when there is 
a full-fledged project contract for which the expertise is required. Independent 
expertise for concrete sale, credit, investment projects are cases in point. Here the 
scope of protected persons is determined by contractual participation in the project. 
More difficult to define is a project that does not rely exclusively on contract. An 
example: After a car accident, the victim pays an independent expert for an 
assessment of the damage; the person responsible for the accident and her 
insurance pay relying on its correctness. In our view it is decisive that the expertise is 
bound to the concrete project of compensation for the concrete car accident, thus, 
the expert is liable to three actors, the victim, the person responsible for the accident 
and to the insurance company.
65 It is not the legal contract, but the economic project, 
more generally the social project that decides about the scope of protected 
persons.
66 Project-orientation provides guidance also for auxiliary activities. When a 
sale of a house is supported partially by a bank credit and backed up by the 
guarantee of another actor, all the actors involved, buyer, seller, bank and guarantor 
have a claim against the expert in terms of umpteenth-party beneficiary contract.
67 
The project orientation would also include refinancing and insurance activities as 
covered by the “real finality” of the expertise.
68 
 
Difficulties arise when the project changes its character over time. Again an example: 
The expertise is at the end utilised for a credit operation instead of a sale of the 
object.
69 Indeed, here we enter the grey area of a social system’s identity. Again, one 
should not look only to the project as such, but to its interrelation with the expertise 
and define the limits accordingly. In the change from sale to credit one would have to 
distinguish. If the requirements for a sale expertise are different then no liability 
toward the creditor, if they are the same then the expert is liable. 
 
Similar difficulties arise when the group of project participants becomes more or less 
indeterminate. If there is a clearly defined small group of participants to the project 
then third party liability will cover each of them. The more, however, the group of 
potential participants moves into the direction of the public at large, the less justified 
is third party liability.
70 Given the public character of disinterested expertise, this may 
sound somewhat counter-intuitive. But here we reach the institutional limits of private 
law liability. There are many legal rules that support the neutrality of public expertise, 
private law liability one among them. Third party liability is adequate for situations 
where expertise is committed to a project with calculable risks. Thus, it protects the 
                                            
65 Steffen (1999): 96. 
66 For the generalization from legal contract to economic project, Canaris (1999): 236; Picker (1999): 
440ff.; for the inclusion of projects from different „contracting worlds“ Teubner (2000): 402ff. 
67 For the extension of expert liability toward the bank who gives a credit for the sale BGH NJW 1987, 
1758; for the extension toward a guarantor of the transaction BGH JZ 1998, 627. 
68 Picker (1999): 443. 
69 This was the situation in the case BGH NJW 1987, 1758. The court held the expert liable inspite of 
the project change from sale to credit. 
70 Here, the limitation of an indefinite scope of beneficiaries comes in as a legitimate concern of law. 
For the argument see BGH NJW 1987, 1758, 1760 and particularly Picker (1999): 438ff. integrity of expertise. But it loses its adequacy when it comes to support the general 
production of public knowledge. An incalculable liability risk would no longer protect 
but stifle the integrity of expertise. This type of liability makes sense only in the 
context of project-bound expertise. For example, a private consumer testing 
institution cannot be made liable to all potential buyers of the product in terms of 
expert liability.
71 In the case of auditors one should distinguish between two types of 
liability. If they fulfil their statutory duties of writing the yearly report, their statutory 
liability towards the enterprise and its affiliates comes in and should not be expanded 
via judicial interpretation. If however, they write a special report on demand of the 
enterprise in relation to a concrete investment, credit or sale project then third party 
liability legitimately comes in.
72  
 
Transaction chains require a similar distinction. If the risk of the subsequent 
transactions is identical, then expert liability applies. If the risk is increased then the 
expert is not liable to the subsequent buyers.
73 In all three cases it is the idea of 
compensating for contractual bilateralisation that limits the scope of protected 
persons. Aspects of calculation of risk and its insurability come in legitimately in 
shaping concretely the institution of project-bound expertise. If the primary aspect of 
expert liability is to stabilise this private institution, then professional insurance is 
reinforcing this aim and the limits of insurability are of relevance for the limits of 
expert liability. 
 
What about third party protection of actors with antagonistic interests on the other 
side of a competitive market? Is the architect in our example liable to expectations of 
the buyer and his financial satellites, or should his liability be limited to those persons 
for whom the seller bears certain responsibilities? This has been a long controversy, 
particularly for the doctrinal construct of a third party beneficiary contract. However, 
for project-bound expertise, antagonism of interests is as irrelevant as is a fiduciary 
relation between mandator and third persons.
74 It is their participation in the project at 
hand that counts to make the expert liable to them, whatever their relations to the 
mandator are. The existence of cut-throat competition on the market and non-co-
operative relations, antagonistic interests or the absence of any fiduciary element of 
the project-parties do not militate against expert liability; just to the contrary, the very 
antagonism of interests strengthens the requirement of strictly independent advice 
and supportive third party liability. 
 
What about the distinction of partisan counsel vs. independent expertise? It should 
be stressed that partisan counsel in itself is a time-honoured social institution. And it 
needs a careful “institutional analysis”
75 in order to determine which set of 
expectation is required in a concrete social situation.
76 Tax counsels, lawyers and 
accountants are cases in point. As a rule their advise is partisan advocacy; they 
exploit professional knowledge legitimately for furthering the interest of their 
mandator. If their expertise is utilised by the other party, there is no third party liability 
                                            
71 Canaris (1999): 238. The monograph by Boecken (1998): 120ff. demonstrates against its own 
intentions the paralyzing effects of a liability toward an infinite number of creditors. 
72 For this distinction BGH JZ 1998, 101; Canaris (1999): 233f. 
73 Hopt (1987): 1746; Canaris (1999): 211. 
74 BGHZ 127, 378; BGHZ 138, 257. See also Zumbansen (2000): 443. 
75 For the concept of institutional analysis and its methods, Selznick (1969): 35ff.; (1992): 229ff. 
76 Cf. the criterion of the expertise’s function in the concrete situation, Canaris (1999): 233.  required.
77 However, there exist rather exceptional situations where these typically 
partisan professions take over the role of a neutral expert.
78 A case in point is the 
recent practice of “third party legal opinions” where the second partner to the project 
explicitly asks for a (binding) legal opinion of the first partner’s lawyer.
79 There are 
other situations, e.g. the so-called “tax opinions” or “comfort letters”, in which the 
interrelation of project contract and expertise contract make clear that independent 
advice of a lawyer, accountant, tax counsel or another partisan expert is required.
80  
 
Another fascinating situation is the case of politically biased research institutions 
when they are asked to provide expertise on concrete projects. Again, the expert-
mandator-contract does not furnish criteria but the broader institutional context of 
function/contribution/reflection. At first glance, they seem to be a classical case for 
project-bound third party liability. And the closer they are to governmental institutions 
(subsidies, public role), the stronger the argument for their liability. However, there is 
a case to be made for the virtue of partisan advice here. Consider “People’s Institute 
of Mother Gaia Autopoiesis” which is financially supported by members of the 
ecological movement. If their advice is sought in a legal and/or political controversy 
on ecological issues where both parties present scientific evidence to corroborate 
their claims, their expertise is part of an adversary institution of truth-seeking. In such 
a context, they are supposed to deliver advocacy expertise, and a third party liability 
would be a threat to their necessarily partisan, one-sided, interest bound inquiry. And 
the argument for advocacy expertise – exploiting any knowledge available to drive an 
explicitly one-sided partisan view to its limits – will be stronger than that for 
independence, disinterestedness and neutrality. 
 
3.Exclusion of Liability and Contractual Defences 
 
This is the Achilles’ heel of contractual doctrines, particularly of third party beneficiary 
contract.
81 Nemo potest trasferre  provides the argument for exposing the third party 
to all defences that the mandator could raise against the expert. It is especially true 
for exclusion of liability. The third party cannot have more rights than the mandator, 
that is what logic dictates. The results are rather strange. In cases where expert 
liability toward third parties is most urgently needed it becomes dependent upon the 
collusion of mandator and expert. The courts try to avoid (some of) these undesirable 
results by inventing just another contractual fiction: Not only do they base expert 
liability on the fiction of the parties’ implicit intention to expand the liability to the third 
party, now they create a second fiction according to which the expert implicitly agrees 
not to raise contractual defences against the third.
82 
 
The weak spot vanishes once an institutional perspective is taken. As soon as implicit 
dimensions are no longer interpreted as referring to the parties’ intentions nor to their 
                                            
77 This was the situation in a case where the third party was influenced by partisan expertise for the 
mandator in settlement negotiations, BGH WM 1962, 933. The courts are also reluctant to create the 
fiction of a „silent“ agreement between a lawyer and third persons to whom ge gives information, BGH 
WM 1978, 576; BGH NJW 1991, 32. 
78 This is especially true when they give advice in investment projects, BGHZ 74, 103; BGHZ 100, 117; 
BGHZ 116, 209; BGHZ 123, 126. Then expert liability toward third parties becomes the rule. 
79 See Gruson et al. (1997); for German law,  Adolff (1996). 
80 Grunewald (1987): 301; Adolff (1996): 122ff.; Neuner (1999): 135. 
81 Canaris (1995): 444f.; (1999): 216ff. 
82 BGH 127,378,385; BGH JZ 1998, 624,625. wider relation, but as referring to those economic and social institutions in which their 
contract participates, then third party liability is no longer a derivative liability of a 
bilateral contract but an originary liability of a trilateral expert-clients relation. This 
liability need not be derived from the mandators’ rights and duties. It is not exposed 
to the defences that the expert could raise against the mandator.
83 It cannot be 
influenced by their contractual exclusions of liability.
84 Rather, liability toward the third 
party which has its roots in the expert’s membership in the scientific community, is a 
direct responsibility to the third party.
85 It comes into life at the moment when the 
contract mandator-expert enters the private institution. 
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